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A CHALLENGE TO CONGLOMERATES: PRIVATE
TREBLE DAMAGES SUITS
by James C. Thomas*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 7 of the Clayton Act1 allows the United States Government
to attack a proposed or completed merger which may potentially lead
to violation of the policy of the antitrust statutes. The remedy for violation in the case of a completed merger is a divestiture order and such
orders have been granted on the authority of Section 7.2 One of the
better known decisions requiring divestiture is United States v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co.,3 wherein Du Pont was required to divest its
shares of General Motors Corporation stock. Notwithstanding the success of the government in obtaining such orders private litigants have
encountered difficulty in bringing a cause of action under Section 7.
In 1963, a federal district court in Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp.4 noted that, "[t]here can be no claim for money damages for
a violation of Section 7 [of the Clayton Act]."'5 While the Gottesman
words were dictum,6 they evidence a general judicial hostility toward
treble damage suits brought by private litigants. These words were reiterated, again in dictum, by the Eighth Circuit in Highland Supply
Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,7 the court inferring that private litigants
have no standing to attack an alleged violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act."
Since Gottesman and Highland Supply, two other courts have denied
private litigants relief under Section 7. In Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co.,9 the Hawaii Federal District Court, in a decision
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).

2 See, e.g., Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464
(1969); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
3 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
4 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
5 Id. at 493.

6 This case involved a pre-trial evidentiary issue; it was not a final determination.
For the District Court's holding on the merits see 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
7 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
8 Id. at 728 n.3.

9 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964), affd mem. 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969).
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affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 10 reasoned that treble damages must
be denied because the injury was caused by practices subsequent to the
acquisition and not by the acquisition itself.11
Dairy Foods Inc. v. Farmers Co-Operative Creamery,'2 decided in
April of 1969, is the latest case holding against private litigants in Section 7 cases on theories analogous to those of Gottesman and Highland
Supply. In each of these cases the underlying reason for denying treble
damages to private plaintiffs was that Section 7 of the Clayton Act is
directed at potential rather than actual competitive injury. Since one is
not permitted to recover damages for potential injury, a private litigant
under this narrow interpretation of the statute, cannot sustain the burden of proving damages.
This position is not without logic. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits only those acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."'" If emphasis
is placed on the words "may be" and "tend", one can technically conclude that the statutory proscription is directed at potential rather than
actual lessening of competition. 1 4 If one accepts this conclusion it is
logical to state that injury to a plaintiff resulting from a corporate acquisition is speculative and therefore not actionable.
The Second Circuit, considering Gottesman on appeal, thought differently.' 5 While agreeing with other courts and the trial court that,
"a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not furnish a basis for
a claim for money damages under the broad language of Section 4 of
the Act,"' 0 the court did allow the plaintiff to show actual damage after
a Section 7 violation had been established. Thus if a private litigant can
show that an acquisition violated Section 7 and subsequent to that acquisition the potential damage became actual, a cause of action for
treble damages lies under Section 417 of the Act.
The Second Circuit's decision in Gottesman answers some of the
criticism leveled at the concept that a private litigant cannot recover
10 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curium).
11 235 F. Supp. at 717.
12 298 F. Supp. 774 0D. Minn. 1969). See also Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes,
Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1095-96 (D. Md. 1969), where the court by resorting to the
Sherman Act avoided the issue.

13 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).

14 See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
15 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969).
16 Id. at 960-61.
'7

15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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damages under Section 7. This viewpoint makes as much sense as
saying that one who gives another poison cannot be held for murder
because, death does not come from the giving of poison, it's the after
affects that kill. The logic of Bailey's Bakery, Highland Supply, and
the federal district court in Gottesman, are reminiscent of the interpretive technique followed in the case where a defendant charged with
leaving the scene of an accident, was released because the person
struck by his automobile was killed instantly thereby leaving no one
to receive his report.' 8
The "no standing" doctrine has been dismissed by some courts as
an illogical interpretation of the statute."9 This rejection comes from
the same court, but different judges, that handed down the decision
in Gottesman. More recently the idea that private plaintiffs should
be prohibited from recovering treble damages in cases involving Section 7 violations was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Dailey v. Quality
School Plan, Inc.20
Without specifically discussing the question, the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,2 1 apparently assumed that treble damages
were available to plaintiffs injured by a corporate acquisition which violated Section 7. In Minnesota Mining the acquired company had, prior
to 1956, been the primary distributor of New Jersey Wood Products. 22
Subsequent to the acquisition, Minneosta Mining notified New Jersey
Wood that the acquired company would no longer distribute its products.2 3 Since the Federal Trade Commission attacked this acquisition,
resulting in a consent order directing divestiture,2 4 the only relief sought
by New Jersey Wood was treble damages.
Although considering only whether the statute of limitations had
run, the Court opined that the construction given to the statute involving treble damages should be construed in light of its legislative
purpose. "Congress," observed the Court, "has expressed its belief
that private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws."'2' Furthermore, the judicial interpreI8 Kelley v. State, 233 Ind. 294, 119 N.E.2d 322 (1954).
19 Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
20
21
22
23
24
25

380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
381 U.S. 311 (1965).
Id. at 315.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 318.
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tation of the statutes should, "lend considerable impetus to that policy.20
In effectuating this policy, the Fifth Circuit in Dailey, and the Second
Circuit in Gottesman, held that Section 7 is included in the term "antitrust laws" as that term is used in Section 4 of the Clayton Act." The
Second Circuit in Gottesman, goes on to hold, "if we had any real
doubts on this issue, we would resolve them in favor of a broad, rather
than a narrow, construction of Section 4.'' 8
The only difference between a private plaintiff and one of the official
enforcement agencies rests with the amount of proof required. Under
Section 7, the government satisfies its burden of proof when it shows
that an acquisition "may be to substantially lessen competition". The
Second Circuit makes the evidentiary requirements of a private litigant
more onerous, postulating; "plaintiffs cannot rest on a showing of a
violation of Section 7; they must, as in private actions under other sections of the antitrust laws, prove that they have been injured by the violation."2 9
The requirement that a plaintiff offer proof of actual injury in order
to recover treble damages, defendants argue, require him to rely on
the Sherman Act. The defendants in Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair
Lanes Inc.,3 0 for example, urged that, "if a private party can show
that a merger has already caused an unreasonable restraint of trade
and that he has actually suffered damages as a direct result thereof,
he can sue and recover in a treble damage action under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act." 1
The advantage to a defendant of requiring a plaintiff to plead under
the Sherman Act, is that the plaintiff becomes forced to satisfy an almost impossible burden of proof. To establish a violation sufficient
to support a private claim, the plaintiff would face precedent such
as found in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 2 and in United
26 Id. The only issue before the Court in this case was whether the statute of

limitation [Clayton Act § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964)] was tolled by authority
of § 5(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), during the pending action
of the F.T.C. The Court ruled, with Justices Harlan and Stewart not participating and
Justices Black and Goldberg dissenting, that the F.T.C. proceeding did toll the statute.
27 Dailey v. Quality School Plan Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Gottesman
v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2nd Cir. 1969).
28 414 F.2d at 961.
20 Id.
30 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969).
31 Id. at 1096.
82 251 U.S. 417 (1920), the Court ruled that bigness alone was not enough to
prove a violation of the Sherman Act.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

States v. Columbia Steel Co.' 3 Should the plaintiff be successful in
satisfying the burden established by these cases, he is still faced with the
numerous Sherman Act merger cases denying relief to private plaintiffs.
Although there have been recoveries by private plaintiffs in Sherman
Act cases,3 4 in the majority relief has been denied.Y
The better view, and the view adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Dailey,
and by the Second Circuit in Gottesman, is that private plaintiffs can
recover damages under Section 7. Courts denying relief on the "no
standing" rationale are apparently motivated by the rule of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (mention of one
thing implies exclusion of another). In following this rule of strict
construction, courts have reasoned that since Congress used the words
"may be to substantially lessen competition", they meant to exclude
actual injury to competition. A better interpretation of this language would be that "may be" is the lowest denominator used to measure the legality of mergers. The phrase is all encompassing, actual competitive injury would include potential competitive injury. Not only is
this interpretation more rational but it is also consistent with the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia
33 334 U.S. 495 (1948). This is the principle case that motivated Congress into
passing the Celler-Kefauver amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act.
34 Pennsylvania Sugar Ref. Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 160 F. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1908), rev'd, 166 F. 254 (2d Cir. 1908). This was not an actual judicial recovery.
In the case, a plaintiff, seeking damages in the amount of $30 million, only won a procedural battle. Following this victory the parties settled for $2 million. Hearings on
S. 2512 Before a Subcomm. on Antitrust Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 184 (1967). Damages were recovered in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co., 295 F. 98 (5th Cir. 1923), af 'd, 273 U.S.
359 (1927).
35 Recovery denied: Acquired corporation as plaintiff: Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co.,
1 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1924); Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1 (3rd Cir.
1917), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 595 (1919); Bishop v. American Preservers' Co.,
105 F. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1900); Bishop v. American Preservers' Co., 51 F. 272 (N.D. Ill.
1892). Competitors as plaintiff: National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v.
Federal Baseball Club Inc., 269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922);
Strout v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 224 F. 1016 (D. Mass. 1913), aff'd, 225 F. 1022
(1st Cir. 1915); Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 152 F. 726 (D. Mass. 1907) (demurrer sustained); Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 202 F. 598 (D. Mass. 1913) (demurrer overruled but case was dropped by plaintiff after United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918)-see Senate Report, supra note 34, at 182). Stockholders as plaintiffs: Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1931) (filed under § 7 Clayton Act); United Copper See. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 223 F. 421
(2d Cir. 1915), aff'd, 244 U.S. 261 (1917) (suit filed by stockholders in name of
corporation); Fleitmann v. United Gas Improvement Co., 211 F. 103 (2d Cir. 1914),
aff'd sub nom. 240 U.S. 27 (1916). Employee as plaintiff: Corey v. Boston Ice Co.,
207 F. 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
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National Bank,36 and United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co." In
both of these cases the Court looked upon the Celler-Kefauver Act 8 as
a Congressional effort to close all loopholes through which merging
corporations could escape prosecution. 9 The Second Circuit in Gottesman follows this rationale, the court holding that, "injury from a Section
7 violation, as distinct from the alleged Sherman Act claims, is ground
for treble damages." 40
With the Second and Fifth Circuits allowing a cause of action under
Section 7 and with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits apparently denying
the same, only the Supreme Court can decide the issue. Should the

Court accept the "no standing" doctrine it will open the widest of
all loopholes in the Clayton Act.

Without treble damages there is

little if any deterrent to illegal corporate mergers. There are no criminal
sanctions under the Clayton Act and thus merging corporations risk

only federal civil prosecution.41 It is reasonable to assume that most
mergers are entered into for profit and that the cost of future divestiture
may be slight in comparison to prospective profits. 42 It may well be
good business to merge in violation of Section 7 since, freed from the
possibility of a treble damage suit, the violator of Section 7 is per-

mitted to retain all profits earned during the protracted period needed
to achieve divestiture.43

U1.

JuDIcIAL HOSTILITY

Regardless of the decision of the United States Supreme Court on
This case did not involve a perfect asset or stock
30 374 U.S. 321, 342-43 (1963).
acquisition. Still there was a merger which the Court held to be within § 7.
37 378 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1964). Court held that § 7 applies to joint ventures.
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1964), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1948).
39 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-49 (1963); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964).
40 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1969).
41 In a take-over bid (tender offer), a representative of an acquiring company
remarked on the possibility that merger might violate the antitrust laws: ". . . business
men should be prepared to take business risks." Vanadium Corp. of America v.
Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 693 (D. Del. 1962). See also FORTUNE, Aug. 1,
1969, at 94, where Ling of L.T.V. inferred that businessmen interested in merging
should not seek advice of Justice Department. "Well, hell, if you ask them, Justice
will always tell you they think they'll look at such a thing with alarm."
42 There is no reason why a private party should not be able to obtain divestiture
relief as this would not prejudice the government's right to file its own charge. The
threat of granting divestiture relief to private parties, whose economic interests are
endangered, would act as an additional deterrent to unlawful mergers. United States
v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954).
43 Id. at 518.
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the availability of Section 7 as a basis for a claim for treble damages,
the inescapable conclusion is that a private litigant has never received
treble damages for an alleged violation of that section. 44 If relief is not
denied with the explicitness of the "no standing" doctrine, then it

is denied because of a lack of directness or causal relation between injury and violation. 45 There are of course those courts that have upheld

the right of private litigants to recover; 40 still there has yet to be an ac47
tual judgment in favor of a plaintiff.
With all the corporate mergers occurring since 1914 and more par-

ticularly since Section 7 was strengthened in 1950 by the Celler-Ke44 See Pollock, Standing To Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTIRUST L.J. 5, 11 (1966); A.B.A., ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
1955-1968, 304 (1968).
45 See Gorham & Johnson, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 308 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963); Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir.
1959); New Grant-Patten Milk Co. v. Happy Valley Farms, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 319
(E.D. Tenn. 1963); Goldsmith v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 201 F. Supp. 867
(W.D.N.C. 1962); Bender v. Hearst Corp., 152 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1957), aft d,
263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959) (there was a recovery of damages under theory of "tortious inducement of a breach of contract." But concerning § 7 there was a question
of whether the acquired company was a corporation. Even if it had been, the circuit
court stated that no private injury resulted from merger. Id. at 363.); cf. Brownlee v.
Malco Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (This actually involved alleged
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, but reasoning is similar to § 7 cases).
46 See Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Julius M.
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); See also Day, Private
Actions Under Section 7 of The Clayton Act, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 155, 155-58
(1965); Recent Developments, Private Party Denied Cause of Action For Treble Damages For Violation of Section 7 of Clayton Act, 64 COLuM. L. REv. 597, 600-01 (1964).
47 The closest thing to a recovery of damages under § 7 of the Clayton Act is
found in Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 110 F.2d 15 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940). In this case,
relief was denied because of the statute of limitation. Action was later renewed under
an alleged Sherman Act violation. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec, Corp., 91 F.
Supp. 874 (D. Del.), aff'd, 186 F.2d 464 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921
(1951) (relief denied-res judicata). Plaintiffs obtained relief between these antitrust
cases through bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of plaintiff's creditors. Columbia Gas
& Electric, which had been charged with violating § 7 of the Clayton Act, sought to
file claim against the acquired corporation which had been placed in receivership. The
Sixth Circuit held that the total claims of Columbia must be rejected. In re American
Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 1941), the case was remanded and
after the government was permitted to intervene to argue that claims be rejected the
trial court ruled that Columbia's claims were "not provable or allowable in bankruptcy." Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. American Fuel & Power Co., 322 U.S. 379,
381 (1944) (appeal dismissed because Government, as intervenor, was not a party to
the action). On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the order was modified. Instead of rejection, the court ruled that "subordination of its [Columbia] claims to those of other
creditors was a more appropriate remedy ...
" In re Inland Gas Corp., 187 F.2d
813, 815 (6th Cir. 1951).
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fauver amendment, the question arises: Why hasn't there been a single
judicial recovery for treble damages? An answer to this question requires one to face the possibility that there has been judicial hostility
against private suits. Statistics indicate that since the enactment of
federal antitrust law, few plaintiffs have met with success in the courts.48
This hostility is most apparent in corporate merger cases. Even
with the evident relaxation of the rules49 in some cases-like pricefixing-courts have retained and applied strict rules in merger cases
to bar private recovery of damages. One commentator explained
this by observing that the degree of judicial strictness is dependent
upon the, "degree of outrage which our society feels against the
practice in question." 50 It was suggested that while price-fixing might
outrage the "sensibilities of most Americans . . . . there appears to
be no equivalent outrage over mergers-especially where the companies are not dominant or where the merger is conglomerate in nature."5'
The lower federal courts have, through the urging of legal scholars,
economists, and businessmen, apparently viewed corporate mergers both
positively and negatively. They have come to believe that if a merger
serves some useful purpose then it is good. The legality of mergers
in other words is tested in light of the public benefit expected to be accomplished. This value judgment method of merger analysis is particularly noticeable with conglomerate mergers which courts justify on the
basis that they accomplish greater business stability.
A.

Presence of Judicial Hostility

There is inferential and explicit evidence of the presence of a long
and continued judicial hostility toward antitrust laws in general and
treble damages in particular. Infused economic value judgments converted into judicial precedent attest to or are the source of this hostility.
It is the mandatory trebling of damages that has, according to Professor Clark, "generated a natural reluctance in the courts to impose
48 During the first 50 years under the Sherman Act, private plaintiffs succeeded in
only 13 out of 175 actions brought. 1955 AT'rY GEN.'S NAT'L Colmmvs. To STUDY Tm
ANTITRUST LAWS 378. (Hereinafter cited ATr'Y GEN.'s REP.). The combined recoveries in these 13 cases amounted to $1,270,000. Note, Nolo Pleas In Antitrust Cases,
79 HARv. L. REV. 1475, 1478 (1966). For a review of the results in all private cases
filed between 1892 and 1963, see Hearingson S.2512. Before a Subcomm. on Antitrust
& Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 180-319
(1967).
49 Pollock, supra note 44, at 10. Relaxation of the passing-on decisions was noted
in the Electrical Cases.

50 Id.

61 Id. at 11.
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prodigious damages upon violators of the act."52 To those seeking to
vigorously compete in the business world, treble damage action are considered unfair threats.

There is strong support for eliminating this

mandatory feature of the law. The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws recommended that trial courts be
given discretion to double or treble damage awards.

8

In rebuking

this proposal, proponents of a strong antitrust law describe it as a "disingenuous attempt to get rid of treble damages altogether.""

This judicial hostility toward treble damages is not limited to the
pens of commentators. Nor is it always hidden behind some acceptable
interpretation device, though such will be used to justify a desired result. Courts have not been so bold as to say that they don't agree with
the law and therefore refuse to apply it as written.55 Although judicially

conceived obstacles are used to block private recoveries, the motivating
hostility does at times surface.5"

The fact that the treble damage remedy is drastic,5 7 or because it is
considered punitive,5 8 has caused the statute to be strictly construed.

Applying this rule of strict construction, it is reasoned that recovery,
"should be allowed only in the rarest of cases where the party bringing suit is a commercial enterpriser."" In addition, since treble damages are considered a windfall, 60 it is reasoned that proof of damage
in an antitrust suit, "should be stronger than in an ordinary civil action.5

61

52 Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private
Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REv.363 (1954).
53 Arr'y GEN.'S REP., supra note 48, at 378-79.
54 Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTTRusT BULL.
167, 176 (1958); see also McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50
Nw. U.L. REv. 342 (1955).
55 "There seems to be a developing trend in some of our trial courts of hostility
toward the 'big' antitrust case and of discovering obstacles-going even back to matters
of pleading and pre-trial . . . ." Eagle Lion Studios, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 248 F.2d 438,
451 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion), affd mem., 358 U.S. 100 (1958).
56 See Loevinger, supra note 54, at 170-71; Pollock, supra note 44, at 9-10.
57 Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.
Mass. 1956).
58 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Applebaum, 217 F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 961 (1955).
59 Allgair v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
60 Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.
Mass. 1956); see also Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 231,
240 (1961).
61 Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Applebaum, 217 F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 961 (1955).
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Judicial hostility is not solely directed toward treble damage actions but is often directed at antitrust laws in general. Justice Holmes
never hid his dislike for the Sherman Act. In expressing this dislike,

Holmes characterized the Act as "a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetency.

'62

The Holmes philosophy made an enduring

imprint upon the Supreme Court up to at least 1964.3 It was built upon an economic belief that monopolies and trusts might be very much
in the public interest. 64 He once described the "great masters of combinations" as men of originality, courage and insight. 65 Holmes believed that survival should go to the strong6 6 and considered the Sher67
man Act unfair because "[ilt won't let the strong man win the race."

Nonetheless, Holmes declared that he must follow the law as written. 66

Even if the Sherman Act is "damned nonsense . . . if my country
wants to go to hell, I am here to help it."6

This public declaration

did not change the fact that he more often than not cast his judicial
vote in favor of mergers70 and against private antitrust prosecution.71
72
Though most writers cite Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
as the judicial reflection of Holmes economic philosophy, there is only
one case where Holmes personally expressed judicially what he so

often said outside the Court.
62

This is the often overlooked case of

1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTES 163 (M. Howe ed. 1941).

63 The Supreme Court in the year 1964 turned away from the Holmes philosophy.

To strike down a bank merger, it relied on the early railroad cases in which the Court
had taken a strict stand against mergers. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
376 U.S. 665 (1964).
64 THE HOLMEs-EINSTmN LETTERS 38 (J. Peabody ed. 1964).
65 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 62, at 163.
06 F. BmDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 8 (1961).
67 C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS, JUSTICE HOLMES AND His FAMILY 360
(1944).
68 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 62, at 163.
00 F. BIDDLE, supra note 66, at 9.
70 Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes joined the
dissent); United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913) (Holmes wrote the opinion);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (Holmes joined majority
opinion which merely reflected what Holmes had said in Winslow case); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (Holmes joined majority).
71 Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922) (Holmes wrote opinion); Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting
Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (Holmes wrote opinion). The Holmes influence was directly felt in Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 202 F. 598 (D. Mass. 1913). After
winning the early procedural rounds, the plaintiff dropped the case after the Government attack on United Shoe was unsuccessful. Hearings on S.2512, supra note 48
at 182.
72 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
See M. LmqEBR, THE Mum AN FMA=r OF JUSTICE HOLMES
217-22 (1943); C. BowEN, supra note 67, at 366-71.
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United States v. Winslow,73 which involved the criminal prosecution
of the United Shoe combination. In rejecting the criminal charge,
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority of the Court said "[oin the
face of it the combination was simply an effort after greater efficiency."74
Furthermore, Holmes saw nothing illegal in the tying arrangements
entered into and constantly enforced by United Shoe. Of these tying
arrangements, accomplished through leasing patented machines, Justice
Holmes said "[t]he machines are patented, making them is a monopoly
in any case, the exclusion of competitors from the use of them is of the
very essence of the right conferred. ...
Government met with no greater success when, seeking dissolu77
tion of the combination, 76 it filed civil charges against United Shoe.
Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, reiterated what Justice Holmes
had said in Winslow. The Holmes philosophy was even more apparent
in United States v. United States Steel Corp.78 Writing once again for
the majority, Justice McKenna almost paraphrased the views held and
earlier expressed by Justice Holmes.
Catherine Bowen, a noted historian, expressing the views of Justice
Holmes, stated: "mere bigness didn't make a merger illegal. How it
behaved, what it did, determined its legality. ' 70 In United States Steel,
Justice McKenna said that it was not the presence of power that would
make the combination illegal; illegality must be based on the use of
power.8 0 A further comparison shows an even greater similarity of
views. On August 1, 1908, Holmes, writing to Lewis Einstein, said: "If
I had to bet, I should bet that monopolies on the whole. . . were very
much for the public interest . .
In a letter dated August
10th of the same year, Holmes spoke of the "originality, the courage,
the insight shown by the great masters of combinations. '8 2 Justice
McKenna said much the same thing in United States Steel as he viewed
the combinations that made that company fully integrated, as necessary for "industrial progress". 83 With regard to the courage and in"..,

78 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
74 Id. at 217.

Id.
After many judicial battles and after much Congressional debate, United Shoe
was finally divided in Feb., 1969. Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1969, at 14.
77 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
78 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
70 C. BOWEN, supra note 67, at 360.
80 251 U.S. at 444.
81 THE HoLMEs-EiNsrIN LETTERS, supra note 64, at 38.
82 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LEITERS, supra note 62, at 141.
83 251 U.S. at 442.
75
76
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sight of the great combinations, Justice McKenna, quoting defendants
84
counsel, described the combination as "a vision of great business".
The favoring of trusts and large business combinations would, on the
surface, appear inconsistent with the purpose of the Sherman Act-to
stop the economic trusts from gaining so much power that they would
"at some not very distant day. . . crush out all small men, all small
capitalists, all small enterprises."8 5 Thus Justice Holmes, in judicially
applying his economic philosophy, seems at odds with his declared intention to "enforce whatever constitutional laws Congress . . . sees fit
86
to pass."1
To maintain a sense of consistency-to enforce the law as written by
Congress and still reduce the force of the law, Justice Holmes used long
accepted techniques of statutory interpretation. These techniques are:
1) construing statutes in light of the common law, 2) strictly construing
statutes in derogation of the common law and, 3) strictly construing
penal statutes. All three techniques have been used by courts to justify
a narrow reading of the antitrust statutes. The general language of the
Sherman Act required, according to Justice Holmes, interpretation in
light of the common law.8 7 Max Lerner, in defense of Justice Holmes
said: "It must be remembered that he was primarily a legal craftsman."88 "The tradition, [of a common law craftsman] in construing
a statute, is to give words their common law meaning, to demand that
innovations be made explicit, to assume that Congress can still have
'89
recourse to redrafting the statute.
Holmes, viewing the Sherman Act in terms of the common law, denied that the history of the concept of "restraint of trade" could include
combinations willingly entered into by two or more parties so long as
others were not excluded. 0 Using this technique of legal reasoning,
courts have conceived many obstacles to the treble damage actions and
private enforcement of the antitrust laws has been relatively limited.
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent liberalization of the area, lower
federal courts equated the treble damage suit as purely private to
the plaintiff involved. A private plaintiff was not the "vindicator" of
the antitrust laws; he served merely as an aid to the government.9 1
84 Id. at 443.
85 21 CONG. R c. 2598 (1890) (remarks of Senator George).
86 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERs, supra note 62, at 163.
87 M. LERNER, supra note 72, at 219.
88 Id. at 222.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 220.

91 Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
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Although private plaintiffs have been loosely described as "private
Attorneys General", 92 most commentators agree that the treble damage
law was enacted to compensate the victim and not to create an army of
bounty hunters. 93 Under this line of reasoning, the private plaintiff
must show injury greater and different from that of the general public.
The injury must be direct and, according to some defense oriented
writers, the injury to "business or property" means an injury to "a commercial venture or enterprise." 94
In construing the treble damage statute under the common law,
courts very early held that plaintiffs must allege and prove some causal
connection between the injury and the alleged antitrust violation. Both
Section 7 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act gave
standing to any person "injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."05 What has caused so
many plaintiffs consternation is the method used to determine when
this causal relation is satisfied.
Emphasis was initially placed on the concept of directness. The degree of directness, however, has varied from the necessity of showing
that the plaintiff was the actual target of the violator to a more flexible
showing that the plaintiff was at least within the target area.00 There
simultaneously developed the concept of "derivative losses" for which
there could be no recovery. The consequence of this doctrinal approach
07
was the judicial categorization of plaintiffs.
Another device reducing the thrust of what was considered an unfair
law involved proof of damages. Using the same reasoning used in common law disparagement cases-the requiring of an allocation and proof
of special damages0 8 -the courts were able to dispose of many treble
damage actions. The specificity of proof of injury has been so arduous
that few plaintiffs satisfy the judicial standards for recovery. 0
A final manifestation of judicial hostility involves the clash between
private contracts and public law. Though the Sherman Act, repre92 Pollock, supranote 44, at 5. But see Timberlake, supra note 60, at 232.
93 Pollock, supra note 44, at 38.

94 Timberlake, supra note 60, at 233.
95 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 18 (1964).
96 Timberlake, supra note 60, at 240-41; Pollock, supranote 44, at 17-19.
97 Pollock, supra note 44, at 12-13, lists parties whose loss was considered derivative.
98 Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
99 See Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1935); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D. El. 1969);
McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Clark,
supra note 52, at 366-70.
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senting public interests, makes illegal private contracts that restrain
trade, courts have upheld those contracts in which a private party
agrees to release from liability the violator of antitrust laws. In two
early merger cases, the plaintiffs' execution of a release after an alleged forced sale of plaintiffs' business was held to bar recovery. 10 0
B.

Perpetuation of Judicial Hostility

Although courts have not used the common law extensively to curtail the effectiveness of other public laws,' 0 ' they have relied on that
precedent to curtail enforcement of the antitrust statutes. These common law rules of statutory construction as applied to the treble damages
provisions have stifled their deterrent effect. To perpetuate this precedent the courts have turned to another device to reduce the effectiveness of the statutes. After repeated decisions' 02 or after sufficient
time for positive action has transpired,0 3 legislative inaction is construed as ratification of existing judicial precedent. This concept is
somewhat unrealistic when the complexity of the legislative process
is considered. Weight given to legislative inaction is simply another
way to justify a strict interpretation of a statute.
This concept has been effectively used to perpetuate long existing judicial hostility toward enforcement of the antitrust treble damage statutes. Relying on legislative inaction, courts have found justification
for refusing to relax the rule of directness of injury. In affirming the
dismissal of a treble damage claim, the Tenth Circuit in 1967 noted
that:
The directness rule has been criticized, but it appears to be through the
years a practical application of the Clayton Act, and in view of the lapse
of time, it must be assumed that it accords with the intention of Con100 Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 323
(10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954); Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v.

Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
But see Novak v. General Electric Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Another case showing the influence of the common law involved the effect of a general
release on other tortfeasors. California Concrete Pipe Co. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 288 F. Supp. 823, 825 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
101 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-128 (1944) (The Court
rejected use of the common law in the interpretation of the National Labor Statutes);
Akers Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 213, 225 n.12 (W.D.N.C. 1968)
("A theory of pleading 'based on common law thinking has no place in administrative proceedings.'")
102 Mclver v. State Highway Comm'n, 198 Kan. 678, 683, 426 P.2d 118, 123

(1967).
103

State v. Ayers, 198 Kan. 467, 472, 426 P.2d 21, 25 (1967).
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gress.. . . If the times have changed, and the needs of business have
changed to bring about a need to extend the right of recovery to others,
Congress would have so indicated. 10 4
Judge Wyzanski expressed similar sentiments in Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc.10 5 Recognizing that the treble damage
section of the Clayton Act was phrased in broad language, he noted
that a long line of decisions' 0 6 denied recovery without a showing of
directness between the antitrust violation and the injury.10 7 In reaction
to this body of precedent and attendant legislative silence, Judge Wyzanski stated:
Congress has failed to amend the anti-trust laws on this point in the
face of repeated decisions. It seems to have been content for the judiciary to take a position narrower than that often applied in non-statutory tort cases and in cases where plaintiffs are not allowed a multiple
08
recovery.
When the legislature re-enacts a statutory provision without making
any changes, as in the case of private treble damage provisions, it is
arguable that the judicial interpretation of the earlier Act has been
approved by the legislature. 10 9 The right of a private person to recover
treble damages was first placed in the Sherman Act in 1890.110 Between enactment of the Sherman Act and enactment of the Clayton
Act in 1914, no less than 55 private cases were filed."' During these
years the philosophy of strict statutory construction developed.
In 1914, Congress re-enacted the treble damage provision of the
Sherman Act with no significant change in the language. 11 2 Thus
one could conclude that Congress had approved or ratified the existing
judicial interpretation of the treble damage provision. In the years
following, the judicial stand against treble damages continued. In 1955,
Congress took action to repeal Section 7 of the Sherman Act in order
to eliminate duplication with Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 118 No
104 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382
F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir. 1967).
105 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
106 Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.
Mass. 1956).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 John V. Carr & Son, Inc. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 935, 941 (Cust. Ct.

1968)
110
111
112
113

(involving tariff acts).
Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 7,
Hearings on S.2512, supra note 48,
Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 4,
Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3,

26 Stat. 210.
at 180-87.
38 Stat. 731 [now 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964)].
69 Stat. 283 (amendment to Clayton Act).
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change was made in the language of the statute authorizing treble
damages.
]]1.

TREBLE

DAMAGES IN SECTION 7 CASES-A VALUE JUDGMENT

Should there be no claim for money damages for a violation of Section 7?11 This is not what the law says, but apparently it is what some
want it to say. Professor Day, shortly after the district court rendered
its decision in Gottesman, concluded that Section 7 does allow private
treble damage suits. 115 Although Professor Day reached this conclusion, he disagreed with this policy and stated: "It is my opinion that
private section 7 actions must either be eliminated entirely, or precisely
delimited."11 6 In a similar manner, Professors Kaysen and Turner
urged that: "There should be no private right of action based on the
117 Kaysen and Turner
acquisition of 'unreasonable market power.' ,,
reasoned that the magnitude of the enforcement task, caused by comprehensive investigations necessary to satisfy vague statutory standards,
required that the major part of enforcement be placed in the Federal
Trade Commission. 8 Both Kayson and Turner believed the standards
of Section 7 to be "vague and uncertain" and felt that: "It is unfair for
private plaintiffs to collect treble damages for conduct the illegality of
which cannot be readily determined in advance."" 9
Two reasons have surfaced for restricting private suits in merger
litigation. First, it would be unfair to subject businessmen to treble
damages if the statutory standards are "vague and uncertain" . x20 However, any existing uncertainty is due principally to a failure to analyze
the statute in light of its legislative purpose. The existing uncertainty
stems from the propensity of writers and lower federal courts to take
the general language of Section 7 and supply a meaning consistent with
economic value judgments they deem desirable.
The second reason for restricting private suits in merger prosecution
is that the removal of private suits from the enforcement scheme would
permit official agencies to pursue a desirable regulatory policy in con114 Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
115 Day, supra note 46, at 155-58.
116 Id. at 160.
117 C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNmE,

ANwarUsT Poucy,AN ECONOaC AN LiGAL ANALYSiS

258 (1959).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 257.
120 See Thomas,
Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional Policy with Enforcement Policy, 36 FoRD. L. REv. 461 (1968).
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tradistinction to strict private enforcement. 121 Professor Day describes
the United States Supreme Court as supporting an almost per se rule
against mergers. In Professor Day's opinion, governmental self-restraint in prosecution of mergers is preferable.' 22 The government,
instead of operating under a strict enforcement policy where every big
agencies to take
merger is attacked, 123 encourages public enforcement
24
approach".'
rational
and
a "relatively calm
To Professor Day, a private treble damage action is considered a
threat to this "calm and rational" approach. 12 Private plaintiffs, motivated by self-interest, do not generally consider the public good of mergers. After sustaining injury to their business or property, private litigants
care little how a merger equates with economic policy and seek blind
adherence to the law. To effectuate a policy in favor of certain mergers, particularly conglomerate mergers, it is essential to remove the unreliable factor-the private plaintiff. Policy arguments, if they are to
be used in deciding the legality of mergers, must come through discretionary enforcement by public agencies, for once prosecution begins
in the courts, such arguments will, at least at the Supreme Court level,
be given little or no weight.
Starting with United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,12 the
United States Supreme Court made it clear that policy arguments in
Section 7 cases would not be accepted. The argument of the defendant
that the merger would increase the bank's ability to compete in New
York with New York banks was held immaterial. The Court ruled that
the pro-competitive effects in one market cannot justify anti-competitive effects in another. 2 ' Without this limitation, the Court reasoned, there would be no limit on mergers except on the largest industry leader.
Justice Black emphatically rejected the subjective approach in United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 128 stating: "it is not for the courts
to review the policy decision of Congress that mergers which may
Black
2.
Justice
J1
substantially lessen competition are forbidden
121
122
123
124
125

Id.

Day, supra note 46, at 161.
Id. at 160.
For a discussion of big mergers, see Thomas, supra note 120, at 540-50.
Day, supra note 46, at 160.
Professor Day considers the potential antitrust plaintiff an "unknown quantity".

374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Id. at 370.
128 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
129 Id. at 552.
126
127
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drawn critical fire from those actively engaged in engineering mergers.
Glen McDaniel, Senior Vice President of Litton Industries, offers a
persuasive argument that mergers are inevitable.' 3 4 He believes they
are inevitable because of the "inexorable technological explosion in industry". 1 35 According to Mr. McDaniel, "the challenges and needs
of consumers and society are undergoing changes, and this process will
also require more corporate mergers.' 13 6 In criticizing those who seek
a simplified formula for judging mergers, Mr. McDaniel argued that
the condemnation of a merger taking place in the present technological
revolution merely because it contributes to that revolution, "is simply
an attempt to maintain the status quo.' 7
The leaders of the giant conglomerates, rather than seeking to maintain the status quo, desire to propel this nation into the 21st century.
They have decided to achieve this goal, not through internal expansion,
but rather, through combination of previously independent companies.
The Gulf & Western Corporation, in a full page newspaper advertisement, describes itself as "The 21st Century Company". 38 Through
such publicity 3 9 there is an effort to extoll the virtues of conglomerates
and to attract sufficient public attention to slow or stop what Mr. Ling
calls "business McCarthyism".
Yet with all the rhetoric about official enforcement, the fact remains,
as Senator Hart observed, that enforcement of the antitrust laws against
corporate mergers is being carried on in a low key.' 40 Using the estimates of the Federal Trade Commission, Senator Hart expressed concern over the possibility that by 1975 the top 200 corporations would
hold 75% of all manufacturing assets. 14 The total number of manufacturing and mining mergers is spiraling so fast that this 75% estimate
could occur before 1975. An analysis of the last two years discloses
that the number of companies acquired jumped from 1,496 in 1967 to
134 McDaniel, Antitrust and the Status Quo in a Changing Society, 1967 N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N ANTITRUST LAw SymPosIuM
135 Id.
130 Id.
137
138

Id. at 5.

141

Id.

1, 3 (1967).

Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1969, at 15.
139 Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1969, at 16-17. For an even more ingenious ad extolling
the virtues of conglomerates, see TimE, Aug. 29, 1969, at inside cover. The Signal
Companies captioned a picture of a beautiful naked girl with, "Conglomerate, like
naked, is not a dirty word."
140 Hart, Emerging Paradoxes In Antitrust, 30 A.B.A. ANTITRusT SECTION 80
(1966).
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noted that many believe the assumption of Congress "that the disappearance of small businesses with a correlative concentration of business in the hands of a few is bound to occur whether mergers are
130
prohibited or not," is wrong.
Professor Turner believes that the disappearance of some small business is inevitable. He suggests that where large diversified firms supplant small single product companies, their loss is due to the increased
efficiency and the force of competition. 3 ' Professor Turner's philosophy, as it relates to conglomerate mergers, closely resembles that
of Justice Holmes who looked upon combinations of capital through
mergers as inevitable and desirable. 1 32 As a Supreme Court Justice,
Holmes, during a period of antitrust judicial hostility, successfully
converted his notion of bigness into legal precedent. Turner, on the
other hand, as the Chief Antitrust Lawyer for the Justice Department, faced a Court that had a history of striking down every merger
presented on the basis of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act. Nonetheless, Turner was able to activate his philosophy, perhaps even more
effectively than Holmes, by formulating an enforcement policy that
favored conglomerates.
The economic diversification achieved by conglomerate mergers, with
resulting business efficiencies, was considered by Turner to be in the
public interest. Under Turner's leadership, guidelines were adopted
by the Justice Department which for the most part manifested his economic philosophy. 3 Other plans for offical merger guidance, regulatory in nature, subsequently came from the Federal Trade Commission-the most significant being the announced policy of pre-merger
clearance.
The policy of discretionary enforcement, based on value judgments,
can be effective only if private suits are eliminated-an event contemplated by the "no standing" doctrine. Between the trial court's decision in Gottesman in 1963, and the Second Circuit's reversal in 1969,
corporations with active acquisition programs have shown little concern over the deterrent force of treble damage suits. What little enforcement of Section 7 remains, comes from the public agencieswhich though following the "calm and rational approach", have still
180 Id.

131 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAIv. L.
Rnv. 1313, 1352-53 (1965).
132 M. LERNER, supra note 72, at 219.
133 Dept. of Justice, Merger Guidelines (released May 30, 1968), in A.B.A., ANTI.
TRusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 (1968).
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2,442 in 1968.142 The acquisition of large firms (defined as companies with assets of $10,000,000 or more) is even more startling-especially if measured in terms of acquired assets. In 1967 the number of
large firms acquired was 169, in 1968 the total was 193. These 193
firms represented assets totaling approximately thirteen billion dollars.143
A comparison of the number of mergers and the number of mergers
challenged (Graphs 1 and 2 Pgs. 314 & 315), reflect the notion that
official antitrust enforcement policy has been at a low key. Professor
Turner, while head of the antitrust division of the Justice Department,
defended his policy of discretionary enforcement by saying "that antitrust
is far too important an instrument of economic policy to be turned into
a children's crusade."'14 4 It seems likely that the number of mergers will
continue to increase so long as economic value judgments are allowed to
over-shadow the congressional policy against any further increases in
the concentration of economic power.
As mentioned in the introduction, without the treble damage suit
there is no deterrent to corporate mergers that appear profitable. Freed
from the threat of private suits, businessmen will engage in vigorous
acquisition programs. Businessmen fail to realize the ultimate consequence of an unrestrained acquisition program. If, as Glen McDaniel
suggests, the technological revolution compels mergers and a centralized economy, we will not have something akin to Galbraith's "Planned
Society or New Industrial State".' 45 When Congress concludes that
business combinations are inevitable, that mergers cannot or should
not be stopped, then we will have a centralized economy with government control. 146 If the trend toward economic concentration is allowed
47
to continue, capitalism will be replaced by statism.'
Congressional desire for a decentralized economic system was not
based on any final notion that this would achieve the greatest degree of
efficiency. It was instead considered to be the most desirable method
142 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMM., STATISTICAL REPORT No. 3

at

9 (Mar. 1969).
143 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE Comm., STATISTICAL REPORT No. 4 at
6 (Apr. 1969).
144 An Interview With The Honorable Donald F. Turner, 30 A.B.A. AN3rrlusT
SECTION 100, 102 (1966).
145 1. GALBRArriI, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE

(1967).

146 TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION
oF ECONOMIC POWER, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1941) [hereinafter cited
TNEC]; 95 CONG. REc. 11498 (1949) (remarks of Congressman Patman); 95 CONG.
REC. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Congressman Celler). Thomas, supra note 120, at

540-44.
14,7 Thomas, supra note 120, at 543.
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of maintaining social and political balance. Reliance was placed on the
forces of free competition to defuse the wealth of the nation among all
its people-to eliminate economic deprivation of some and social suppression of others. Congress, while considering the Clayton Act, was
warned that unless the "brazen defiance of the spirit of the laws made
to protect the public" are stopped, there is the danger that "the masses
of the people will forget their patient endurance of injustice and long
suffering submission to wrong on the part of exploiting combinations
and start a conflagration against which fire insurance will offer no protection."' 48
Unless, through vigorous enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Act, we
achieve that level of economic decentralization sought by Congress,
government controls will become a necessity. What form these controls
will take will necessarily depend on the same goals that Congress wished
to achieve through economic decentralization. Opposition to increases
in economic concentration was based on a desire to insure the independence of local communities and local sovereignties, thereby insuring the
greatest protection against unemployment. It was observed in the economic studies preceding the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act that
because economic centralization has caused production facilities to be
removed from certain geographical areas, "[m]ayors of great cities, and
Governors of great states have beaten a path to Washington begging the
Federal Government to undertake Federal enterprises in the local com140
munities to solve local problems of unemployment.'
Thus if mergers persist, Congress will, as we are already seeing, be
faced with the the problem of creating Federal jobs, or, as an alternative,
set employment quotas for each of the giant corporations. Because
corporate mergers are causing business units to be removed from
some geographical areas, certain states are becoming economically subservient to the more powerful economic forces. If allowed to continue,
Congress will be faced with the choice of dictating plant locations for
the giant corporations or to equalize the economic base of all states by
pumping federal money into economically depressed areas. Some believe that decentralization would provide the greatest protection to consumers in the form of lower prices, etc. This protection has been lost
in the vast corporate merger movement which has been linked to the
problems currently associated with inflation.'8 0 One might thus expect,
51 CONG. REC. 9087 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Kelly).
TNEC, supra note 146, at 6.
150 Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 191 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1863
(1966).
148
149
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if mergers are inevitable, tight government controls to regulate the inflationary movement even to the extent of the eventual regulation of
consumer prices charged by industrial empires.
Unfortunately, analysis of the anti-merger statutes has been left almost entirely to the economists. As Senator Hart observed, "liberals
have turned their attention elsewhere and-one gets the feeling-treat
antitrust as an old race horse who should be retired to pasture."' 151
Consequently, while demanding protection against political abuses, the
so-called liberals, ignorant of the antitrust laws, are losing their liberty
to economic combines. We are reaching the point when independent
businesses can exist only at the will of the industrial giants-particularly the conglomerates which have effectively used the "tender offer" in their take over bids. Official enforcement has failed, and if free
competition is desirable, private treble damage suits must be elevated
as the primary enforcement vehicle.
IV.

TREBLE DAMAGES IN SECTION

7

CASES-CONGRESSIONAL POLICY

One student writer, after a comprehensive study of the issue of standto sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws, summed up by saying:
The evident purposes of Section 4 are the self-enforcement of the antitrust laws, the deterrent effect of possible treble liability, and the compensation of persons injured by violations. Its purpose is so broad and
its mandate so clear that any person who can show damage prima facie
should be within the protected class. . . . In view of the section's
broad language and purpose, the presumption should be in favor of the
that to allow his claim would
plaintiff's right of action, absent a showing
152
be contrary to congressional intent.'
This concept of standing drew strong criticism from one member of the
Bar who replied: "Those who speak glibly of what Congress 'intended'
are frequently telling us more of their own views and predilections,
rather than those of Congress."' 53 In raising this criticism, the writer
was taking the statute and its accompanying legislative history too light-

ly.
Roscoe Pound, as early as 1908, recognized that statutes were taken
too lightly, that they were being considered by many writers as second151 Hart, supra note 140, at 80.
152 Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 64 COLum. L. REv. 570, 587 (1964).
153 Pollock, supra note 44, at 8-9.
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GRAPH I
Manufacturing "&Mining
Total Number of Mergers Compared with Total Challenged-1951-1968.
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Year
Source: Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, '90th Cong., Ist Sess., The CellerKefauver Act: Sixteen Years of Enforcement 37-39 (Coram. Print Oct. 16, 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Staff Report]. (for years 1951-1966).
Source for years 1967-1968-Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission,
Statistical Report No. 3, p. 9 (March, 1969) and correspondence from the FTC.
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Source: Staff Report 5, table 2.
Source for years 1967-1968-Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Statistical Report No. 4, p. 6 (April, 1969) and correspondence from FTC.
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ary to judicial decisions.1 54 Though considered "fashionable to preach
the superiority of judge-made law,"' 15 5 Pound urged that:
It may be well
for judges and lawyers to remember that there is
coming to be a science of legislation and that modem statutes are not to
be disposed of lightly as off-hand products of a crude desire to do something, but represent long and patient study by experts, careful consideration by conferences or congresses or associations, press discussions in
which public opinion is focused upon all important details, and hearings
before legislative committees. 56
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, applied only within the narrow boundaries drawn by judicial decisions, offers a good example of what Pound
was making reference to. The legislative mandate that "[a]ny person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained' '1 57 has been approached in the
most unscientific fashion. Ignoring existing legislative history supporting the standing of "any person" injured, courts have used the interpretive process to curtail the full force of the treble damage suit.
Before considering specifics, certain general observations and assumptions must be made if for no other reason than to impose some
limitation on this study. It is assumed that Congress by including
Section 7 in the Clayton Act was desirous of stopping those corporate
mergers that "substantially lessened competition". More important, it
is concluded that Section 7 applies equally to horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate mergers.
Since conglomerate mergers bring together companies which are not
in competition (horizontal mergers) nor in any integrated line (vertical
mergers), the view has been expressed that conglomerate mergers are
not illegal under Section 7. The statute makes illegal only those mergers that substantially lessen competition. This fact gave rise to a presumption that conglomerates were exempt, or at least should be considered under different standards. There seems no foundation for such a
presumption. Congress, in creating a single statutory standard, was
well aware of the existence of conglomerates. 58 Congressman Boggs,
in the congressional debates, was even led to observe that the conglomerate merger "is one of the most detrimental movements to a free enterPound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAxv. L. REv. 383 (1908).
155 Id. at 383-84.
156 Id. at 384.
167 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
158 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
154
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prise economy."1 59 He stated: "By this process they build up huge
business enterprises which enable them to play one type of business
Since FTC v.
against another in order to drive out competition."'1 6
Proctor& Gamble Co.,16 1 any question still extant about the application
of Section 7 to conglomerate mergers should be academic. As Justice
Douglas observed: "All mergers are within the reach of section 7, and
they are classified as
all must be tested by the same standard, whether
16 z
horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other.'
Thus it would follow that if Section 4 allows treble damages for Section 7 violations-the treble damage suit can be used against conglomerates. The strong legislative history accompanying the enactment of
Sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act indicate that Congress, contrary to
the effect of the "no standing" doctrine, manifested a clear desire
to expose merging corporations to the force of private suits. To satisfy
standing, one should need only to define business or property that has
been injured by a corporate merger-be it horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other.
A.

Private Suits Against Mergers

The standing of private parties to seek treble damages against corporations violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act is best supported by
the legislative history of that statute. The debates evidence Congressional opposition, at times reaching proportions of dogmatism, to economic bigness-or more precisely to the methods used to gain or retain
economic bigness. In the statute, the authoritative boundary within
which courts must remain, Congress attacked specifically those practices openly used by industrial giants to capture more power-price
discrimination; 163 tying arrangements; 64 acquisitions of capital stock;165
and interlocking directorates. 6 6 In the statutory sanctions, Congress
relied upon the private plaintiff who suffered injury to curtail violations
through the treble damage suit.
To understand the significance of the role of private suits one must
159 95 CONG. REC. 11496 (1949)
160 Id.
161 386 U.S. 568 (1967).

(remarks of Congressman Boggs).

162 Id. at 577.
Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
164 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
anti-United Shoe Machinery Co. section. See 51
31, 15988-96 (1914).
166 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
166 Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
163

This could well be termed the
CONG. REC. 9090, 16273-74, 15830-
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think in terms of, and with, the ferver then present in Congress. In describing this ferver, Senator Clapp remarked: "There are those who fear
the tyranny of the many, but the fact is that the eternal struggle of the
ages has been on the part of the many to protect themselves from the
agressions of the few."'167 Protection of the public from agression of
this few, required the elimination of the use of value judgments in distinquishing good and bad combinations. In response to a suggestion
that the dissolution of the "great combinations" might cause more harm
than good, Senator Reed bluntly retorted:
I deny, Sir, that monopoly is a good thing. There can be no monopoly
that is not built upon the grave of human hopes. There can be no
monopoly that has not crushed out the life and the prosperity of indi8
viduals and of communities.16
Big business, the invisible government that over the years controlled
the visible government had, Congressman Kelly insisted, through its
"arts of trickery and debauchery" brazenly defied the spirit of the laws
made to protect the public.16 9 He urged Congress to act immediately to
halt further increases in economic concentration, stating: "The time
for forbearance is over and the time to strike has come."' 70 Congressman Kelly saw no room for compromise; there must, he said, be a complete halt to the "evils which have brought concentration of wealth and
17
diffusion of poverty.' '
Challenging the economic combinations that created, in the hands
of private parties, sufficient power with which to demand and obtain
obedience from the states and their political subdivisions, compelled a
policy of vigorous enforcement. The solution to the trust problem, in
the opinion of Senator Norris, required at least one of two things"make it financially unprofitable for anyone or any set of men to organize a trust [or] provide, by proper criminal law, jail sentences for
those who organize and control trusts in violation of the law."'1 72 The
most effective enforcement would, according to some, come through
criminal sanctions applied against the violator of the antitrust law just
as the criminal law is used against "the poor devil who is engaged in
7
stealing because he is hungry.'
Congressman Floyd agreed that criminal penalities should have been
51 CONG. REc. 16053 (1914) (remarks of Senator Clapp).
168 Id. at 15867 (remarks of Senator Reed).
169 Id. 9087 (remarks of Congressman Kelly).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 16,051 (remarks of Senator Norris).
167

'73

Id. at 16,045.

1970]

A CHALLENGE TO CONGLOMERATES

retained, but believed and insisted that the civil remedies would in practice be far more effective. 174 Courts and juries have generally followed

the philosophy that penal statutes ought to be strictly construed.

In

criminal cases, consistent with this notion of strict construction, proof to
establish guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand,
a point affirmatively urged by Congressman Floyd, civil cases require
only a preponderance of evidence. 175 With this lesser burden of

proof,

76 coupled

with the right of any person injured to initiate prose-

cution, the most effective and the most vigorous enforcement would be
77

assured.'

No distinction between public and private complainants was intended
in the application of suits against persons violating any of the several

substantive provisions of the Clayton Act. With all differences existing
between the bills passed by each House resolved, Congressman Floyd
acknowledged that the Conference Committee understood that private
suits applied in Section 7 merger cases. He conceded that for price
discrimination, tying arrangements and unlawful acquisition of stock
under Section 7, there were no criminal penalties, but emphasized that
"they are still provisions of the antitrust laws, and every civil remedy

that is applicable to any antitrust law may be invoked for their enforcement.'1 78 "If a man is injured . . . by the unlawful acquisition of
stock of competing corporations 179 . . . , he can go into any court and
enjoin and restrain the party from committing such unlawful acts or
sue for his damages.' 180 Furthermore, these private plaintiffs can go
174
175
170

Id. at 16,319 (remarks of Congressman Floyd).

Id. at 16,318.
The Supreme Court has moved closer to the Congressional policy established
in the Clayton Act in a series of private cases. As early as 1931 the Court, in Story
Parchment Co. v. Peterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), expressed
sentiments toward changing the strict proof of damages requirement. Id. at 562-63.
The change came in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946). It
was determined that uncertainty in the proof of damages must be borne by the wrongdoer. Id. at 265. The impact of Bigelow was discussed in Clark, supra note 52.
In its most recent move to relax the judicial strictness applied in treble damage cases,
the Court greatly reduced the proof necessary to show directness or causal relation.
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648-50 (1969).
177 51 CONG. REC. 16,319 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd).
178 Id. at 16,318.
179 Since these words were spoken, Congress strengthened § 7 by the 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendment. Reference here to "competing corporations" is, however,
interesting in light of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957). For 35 years prior to this case, § 7 had not been applied against vertical
mergers; it was held here that the statute applied to both horizontal and vertical
mergers.
180 51 CONG. Rc. 16,319 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd).
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into court "without waiting upon the slow tortuous course of prosecution on the part of the Government."''
In spite of this unquestionably clear declaration of legislative purpose
contained in the report of the Conference Committee, courts following
the "no standing" doctrine have held that there can be no private
recovery of damages based on a Section 7 violation. Since Section 7
uses the language "may be to substantially lessen competition," it has
been reasoned that the statute was directed at potential and not actual
lessening of competition. Thus injury to a private plaintiff is too speculative or remote. As if conscious of the eventual judicial creation of
the "no standing" doctrine, Congressman Webb has said that one of
the main features that would make this law effective was the private
82
suit.
Under Clayton, unlike Sherman, the individual who is harmed,
reasoned Congressman Webb, is not required to prove an actual restraint of trade. The private action can be supported upon proof of
"things that lead up to restraints of trade and monopolies."' 83 Even
though a corporate merger has not ripened into any actual lessening of
competition or into a monopoly, the "business or property" of many
people might be effected detrimentally by the acquisition itself. Without trying to identify specific parties injured, a showing that would differ with each case, one might say that the efficiency gained by a merger
will generally have a damaging effect on others. To gain efficiency,
departments of the acquiring and acquired corporations may be consolidated to the detriment of employees, supply firms, supporting institutions and the community itself. If these persons are injured in their
business or property by the things that, if left alone, could lead to a
1 84
lessening of competition, they have the right to bring suit.
Private parties "threatened with a loss" can, in their effort to regain a
competitive market, likewise obtain divestiture relief.' 85 In expressing
the understanding of the Conference Committee, Congressman Floyd
observed that private litigants were, under the proposed Clayton Act,
given a remedy never enjoyed before. "Heretofore, there has been only
one power that might enjoin an unlawful trust or monopoly in restraint
of trade, and that was the Government of the United States, under the
181 Id.

182 Id. at 16,274 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
183 Id.

184 Id.
185 See Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969).
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direction of the Attorney General. ' 186 Now it is proposed that "any
individual, company or corporation. . . can.
go into court and enjoin the doing of these unlawful acts." 187 This private injunctive relief
was said to be "specifically applicable to Sections 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 of the
bill."18 8
Although most authority would allow private plaintiffs divestiture
action, there is some evidence to the contrary.189 This evidence is
found in the congressional consideration of explicit statutory language
that would have conferred standing on stockholders to sue their own
corporation for violating the act. 190 Before sending the bill into conference to iron out the differences between the two Houses, there was a proposed section that provided:' 91
That any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation or against officers of a corporation by stockholders thereof
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts any
business ....
When the bill came out of conference, reference to stockholders
had been deleted, causing in the Senate, a heated debate between
Senators Chilton and Norris.' 9 2 Senator Chilton, explaining and defending what the conferees did, gave two reasons for striking the words.
First, he said that the right of stockholders to sue, if that was desirable,
was misplaced-had nothing to do with the question of venue involved
in the section changed.' 93 The second reason, more pertinent to the
present discussion, was that these stockholders ought not to have jurisdiction to "mix up in a suit by the Government to dissolve these corpo1 94
rations.'
Continuing even more insistently, Senator Chilton argued that "we
do not want to bring the antitrust laws into contempt by allowing officers and stockholders who go into these trusts to use the antitrust laws
to fight out and settle their own differences." 9 5 "We do not want Tom,
Dick, and Harry, who may be stockholders, to bring suits against the di186 51 CONG. REc. 16,319 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Floyd).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 16,048-51.
190 Id. at 16,048.
'91

Id.

192 Id. at 16,048-51.

198 Id. at 16,049 (remarks of Senator Chilton).
194 Id. at 16,050.
195 Id. at 16,049.
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rectors here and there and probably interfere with the ordinary course
of the Government's suits."'19 6 Senator Norris shot back with the question: "What are you going to do when you have an Attorney General
who believes in these combinations, who will not turn a wheel to break
197
any of them Up?'
Isolated from the general congressional policy conceived in the Clayton Act, some credence must be given to the remarks of Senator Chilton.
Nevertheless, in viewing the legislative history and the adopted words
as a whole, there exists an apparent inconsistency. Explaining the
Conference Report on the House side, Congressman Floyd had emphatically said that private injunctive relief did apply to Section 7 merger cases. "If a man is injured. . . by the unlawful acquisition of stock
by competing corporations. . . , he can go into any court and enjoin
and restrain the party from committing such unlawful acts or sue for
his damages."' 198
Neither the mechanics of the change nor the legislative history of the
Clayton Act, support the enforcement philosophy urged by Senator
Chilton. As the proposed section stood, the stockholders referred to
were limited to those of the corporation participating in the antitrust
violation. Furthermore this reference was in a section of the bill involving venue, a matter foreign to the standing of individuals to sue. There
were already separate provisions authorizing any person injured in his
business or property to seek damages or injunctive relief. The question
of a stockholder's standing to sue must be decided on the basis of these
general provisions.
Philosophical support is found for the views expressed by Senator
Chilton. Professor Day, influenced by the theory of Professors Kaysen
and Turner, 19 9 believed that dissolution and divestiture should be limited
to cases initiated by official agencies-namely the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission.2'" He observed that "the private
antitrust plaintiff is interested only in his own competitive well being
and may seek divestiture without regard to broader public-interest considerations."' 0 ' Unlike private plaintiffs, motivated perhaps by greed,
revenge, self-interest, the official enforcement agencies weigh all policy
matters before suit is filed. Even with prosecution, these agencies,
196

Id.

197 Id. at 16,051 (remarks of Senator Norris).
198 Id. at 16,391 (remarks of
199 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER,

Congressman Floyd).

supra note 117.

200 Day, supra note 46 at 161-62.
201

Id. at 162.
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may seek a remedy short of complete
on the basis of a policy decision,
20 2
dissolution.
or
divestiture
It was partially to avoid such a policy approach and to insure vigorous enforcement, not enforcement based on a regulatory plan, that
Congress elevated the private suit to a position of prominence. Viewed
generally or specifically, there is no compelling evidence found to support the argument that Section 7 enforcement should be a function
exclusively held by official agencies. Floor debates preceding the
Clayton Act, evidence no strong Congressional expressions of faith or
confidence in the Attorney General's enforcement competency. In
fact one finds evidence of the antithesis. For example, Senator
Thompson, explaining why the Sherman Act had failed, said that "those
in power were either too friendly with or too much afraid of the men of
wealth. ' 203 If this were the problem, it was suggested that instead of
passing new laws to go unenforced, Congress ought to pass a law to
force those responsible to do their duty.20 4 But what can be done to
force an Attorney General, sympathetic to economic combinations, to
prosecute? As Senator Norris noted, even if we should hire 10,000
lawyers they would be under the supervision of the Attorney General. 20 5
One Senator who played a major role in the Clayton Act debates,
offered a solution. By amendment, Senator Reed suggested that the
Attorney General of the United States be given 90 days in which to
act to prevent a violation of the antitrust laws. If, during this period,
he failed to act "the Attorney General of any state" could initiate prosecution.20 Senator Reed, in support of his amendment, observed that
there were then pending in the courts only 46 antitrust cases when "there

ought to be

4 0

0.1120 7

"If that is the record that has been made for 20

long years in the Department of Justice it is high time that men elected
by the people of the respective States should be given authority to invoke
2 08
this great law and to put some blood and iron into its enforcement.
Denying any vindictiveness, Senator Reed declared:
I am not prepared to charge bad faith to past Attorneys General of the
United States, but I am prepared to say that, in my humble judgment, the
same zeal has not been back of the enforcement of this law many times
that has been back of the enforcement of the laws aimed at the poor fel202
203
204
205

Id.
51 CONG.

REC. 14,222 (1914) (remarks of Senator Thompson).
Id. at 14,261 (remarks of Senator Lane).
Id. at 14,524 (remarks of Senator Norris).
206 Id. at 14,514 (remarks of Senator Reed).
207 Id.

at 14,519-20.
208 Id. at 14,520.
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low who makes moonshine whiskey or sells a box of cigars without having the correct number of stamps upon the box. As to any law that has
been so enforced that monopoly has grown like a green bay tree, so that
its evil roots have spread into every State and every community, I am
prepared to say that you need some more enforcement and you need
20 9
some independent action by independent men.

These independent men to whom reference was made were the States'
Attorney General-the 48 watchdogs as Reed called them.2 10

The Reed Amendment failed by a vote of 21 to 39 with 36 not voting. Notwithstanding this defeat there was strong support for the
amendment and the opposition expressed was not based on any favor
to trusts or economic combinations. 21 ' It was generally believed that
there were already sufficient checks placed on the Attorney General.
If he refused or failed to prosecute "the individual himself has a wide'
open door to go into court and sue."212
In addition, creation of a Federal Trade Commission was considered another check on the office of

the Attorney General.2 13
The most effective check placed on the Attorney General, the "real

teeth in enforcement" as Congressman Webb described it, 214 was the
private suit seeking treble damages or injunctive relief.

Recognizing

its deterrent force, it was believed that private prosecution should be
made easier and more available to individuals.2 15 To increase this deterrent force by making private suits easier, final judgments in suits
filed by the government were made "prima facie evidence against such

defendant" in a subsequently prosecuted private action.210
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 14,522.

Id. at 14,515.
For the full debates, see id. at 14,514-26.
Id. at 16,275 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
Id. at 14,516 (remarks of Senator Gallinger). During the debates of the bill
creating the FTC, it was suggested that enforcement would be more effective if the
Attorney General was given investigatory power. Id. at 8845 (remarks of Congressman Covington). As this is a political office, such power was considered unsafe.
Id. at 8857 (remarks of Congressman Morgan). Congress therefore considered it safer
to place such power in the hands of a Commission not subject to any political office but
"subject only to the people of the United States." Id. at 8981 (remarks of Congressman Willis).
214 Id. at 16,274 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
215 Id. at 16,046 (remarks of Senator Borah).
216 Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964). There were lengthy debates leading
to the conclusion that these final judgments should be given prima facie and not conclusive weight. 51 CONG. REc. 9079, 9090, 9164-65, 9198, 9270, 9487-94, 13,851-55,
13,897-902, 15,824-25, 15,939, 16,003, 16,046, 16,058, 16,276 (1914). Included in these
debates was a strong feeling for making final Government judgments conclusive evidence. Objections raised involved two points with one showing more evidence of an

A CHALLENGE TO CONGLOMERATES

1970]

Confidence was placed in the private suits, even more than criminal
sanctions, to stop the growth of trusts and the anti-competitive concentration of economic power. While preferring retention of the criminal
penalty, Congressman Webb defended its deletion by observing that
the real teeth in enforcement was the private suit. 217 Just "let a
businessman somewhere in the United States, or 40 or 50 of them, be
damaged by the things that are denounced as unlawful in this section,
and let them all bring suit. "That", said Congressman Webb, "is bigger. . . and will have a more deterrent effect on the men who practice
those things than a mere criminal penalty." 1 8 The deterrent force of
private suits was vocalized even louder by Senator Borah, who said:
There is no influence or power quite so effective in the enforcement of
law as that of the injured private party. A bureau or a department of
justice may postpone or procrastinate with reference to the enforcement
of statutes, but a man who has suffered an injury, and knows that he
has suffered an injury, and sees a speedy remedy for it, a remedy which
he can pursue without the fear of bankruptcy, though he be a man of
limited means, will almost invariably seek his recovery; and while he is
seeking his recovery he is bringing about greater respect for the law
and more obedience to the law upon the part of those who might violate
it.219

Calling for an army of private litigants, Senator Borah continued:
There could be no safer guardian for the Sherman Antitrust Law than
the hundreds and thousands of people who are injured by these monopolies if the law were made easy of enforcement so far as they are con2 20
cerned.
Congress, contrary to what courts have done, demonstrated no effort
to categorically define persons who could seek treble damages or injunctive relief against violators of Section 7 or any of the other provisions of the Clayton Act. Reference instead was made to the hundreds and thousands of people who are injured. Congressman Webb
observed that under Section 4 "any man throughout the United States,
hundreds and thousands, can bring suit . . . , and thus the offender
eyes because you are threatening to take money
will begin to open2 his
21
pocket.
his
out of
existing lack of confidence in the Attorney General. Besides the constitutional issues
raised (Id. at 13,851, 15,824), fear was expressed that collusive suits would be invited
between Government and defendant. Id. at 9489-93.
217 51 CONG. REc. 16,274 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Webb).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 15,986 (remarks of Senator Borah).
220
221

Id.
Id. at 16,275 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
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There was discussion, dating to the Sherman Act days, that might
shed light on the meaning of the statutory phrase--"any person."
Senator George assumed that the Sherman Act treble damage section
gave standing to the farmer, mechanic, laborer and small consumer.222
Yet he thought it a shame to throw these "poor unlettered" parties
against the large corporations with their unmatched economic power.228
224
Urging strongly that "the consumer is the party damnified or injured",
Senator George predicted (a prediction not too far from being true)
that "not one suit will ever be brought under section 7 of the Sherman
Act by any person who is simply damaged in his character as consumer."'225 With passage of the Clayton Act, in which injunctive relief
was added, these same parties were recognized as those protected by
the Act. Persons suffering the most from the great combinations of
wealth were identified as "the consuming public"; 220 "the struggling
poor of our country"; 227 the employee who loses his job;2 28 and the
"citizens and their children" who desire the right to enter business. 229
There was fear expressed that the scope of the treble damage provision
would possibly lead to "blackmail" suits. 230 It was argued that there
was nothing to protect businessmen from these suits. "This bill," observed Congressman Levy, "is all in favor of the complainant." 28 1 Replying to this fear, Congressman Webb said; "I do not know any way to
stop a man from making accusations or bringing a suit, but people
soon get tired of bringing blackmailing suits when they are mulcted in
costs, and there are not very many such suits brought. 28 2
There should be no doubt about the congressional desire for a policy
of vigorous enforcement. But doubt or not, it is still an inescapable
and unfortunate fact that courts have, in spite of a rich and persuasive
legislative history, so narrowed the standing of private antitrust plaintiffs that little enforcement emanates from this source. Even if standing is recognized for competing and acquired corporations, the real
force of the private suit has been weakened. Since merger activity, is
222 21 CONG. REc. 3150 (1890) (remarks of Senator George).
228 Id. He desired that jurisdiction be placed in state courts considered, at that
time, more available to the poor.
224 Id. at 1767 (remarks of Senator George).
225 Id. at 3150 (remarks of Senator George).
226 51 CONG. REc. 16,043 (1914) (remarks of Senator Norris).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 16,044.

229 Id. at 9088 (remarks of Congressman Mitchell).
230 Id. at 16,275 (remarks of Congressman Levy).

231 Id.
232 Id. at 16,275 (remarks of Congressman Webb).
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so prevalent and acceptable in the business world, commercial enterprises are no longer a completely reliable enforcement factor. Private
prosecution has at times been initiated in an attempt to accomplish a
more desirable merger rather than to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.23 3 To achieve effective enforcement it is necessary for courts to
discard the strict rules of directness and to expand standing to any person who has suffered injury.
B.

Legislative Silence

Courts have been content with perpetuating strict rules of standing in
antitrust cases under the fiction that congressional silence over many
years amounts to legislative approval or ratification. When stripped of
its value judgment embellishments, legislative silence should not be controlling. If one considers the complexities of the legislative process,
the constitutional requirements for the passage of a law, the device must
be rejected. There can be no presumption that legislators, who have
neither the time nor the inclination, sift through all judicial opinions to
decide when to act.2 3 4 There is no technical legislative machinery set
up to review all judicial opinions. More often than not, Congress is
motivated into action by the force of public opinion.
Actually, a philosophical discourse against the judicially conceived
"legislative silence" device is not necessary in the area of antitrust; for
Congress in 1914, was far from remaining silent about the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act. Motivated by the loud cries of the
populace, as evidenced in the 1912 National Political Party Platforms, 236
Congress sharply criticized, almost to the point of being vindictive, the
federal courts. The vindictive spirit present during the debates on the
Clayton Act led one Senator to say that, "[To my mind, the most reprehensible piece of politics that has been practiced upon the public has
For a discussion of such use, see Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268
F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353,
230 A.2d 769 (1967). But see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826, 831
1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 395 U.S. 971
(N.D. Ill.
(1969).
234 Legislative inaction or misunderstanding cannot change the meaning of a statute. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
235 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMs, 1840-1956 at 169 (compiled by K. Porter & D.
Johnson, 1956). "We regret that the Sherman antitrust law has received a judicial
construction depriving it of much of its efficiency and we favor the enactment of
legislation which will restore to the statute the strength of which it has been deprived
by such interpretation." Id.
233
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been the constant attack upon the courts." 2301
It is apparant that Congress was reacting to the judicial hostility so
freely exercised against the antitrust laws. There was concern over the
fact that this hostility had so weakened antitrust enforcement that the
threat of economic combinations continued unabated. The courts
were further criticized for converting the Sherman Act from an antitrust law to an anti-labor law. Although used with temerity against
trusts, the Sherman Act was used freely as authority to issue injunctions against labor organizations.2 3 7 It was such use of the Sherman
Act that drew the most violent and bitter remarks.
For their misapplication of the antitrust laws, federal judges were
called tyrants who usurped and assumed power rightly belonging to the
legislature.2 38 Congressman Quin charged that:
"the judicial tyranny of this country is today written through the decisions. If you will read these decisions, you can see tyranny there that
is equaled nowhere on earth except by the Czar of Russia or, perhaps
the ruling of some military court; and there is not a man in the United
States who could ever have any respect for the ruling of a court-martial." 23 9
Powerful corporations were accused of having too much influence in
naming federal judges. Before being named a judge, Congressman
Quin observed, it is often true that the judge "has spent his life as the retained attorney of the special interests, and it matters not how honest he
may be, he sees the law from a different view point as distinguished
from the ordinary citizen."2 40
Similar views were expressed by other Congressmen. Congressman
Graham, for example, felt "[t]he history of the world proves that
the possessors of great wealth constantly strive for special privileges,
and too often get them."' 241 Referring to the struggle between organized
wealth and organized labor, he said that "the Federal courts, consciously, have leaned too much to the side of organized wealth. 2 42 Remarks
such as these 243 did not fall on deaf ears. Congress incorporated Section
236
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CONG. REc. 15,984 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah).
Id. at 9173-74 (101 cases listed to show free use of Sherman Act against
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labor).
238 Id. at 9665 (remarks of Congressman Quin).
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Id.

240
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Id. at 9666.
Id. at 9250 (remarks of Congressman Graham).
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51 Cong. Rec. 9173, 9541, 9559 (1914).
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6 and Section 20 of the Clayton Act24 4 as the most expedient way to
had been "influenced by the
remove the interpretation of the law that245
rich.1
criminal
the
of
combinations
vicious
As critical but not as vehement were charges that the existing judicial
interpretation of the Sherman Act had nurtured and contributed to the
growing threat of trusts and economic combinations. "Trusts," observed Senator Thompson, "would never have existed in their present
and iniquitous form if the laws already on the state books had been
vigorously enforced in the beginning. ' 24 1 Even those who expressed
confidence in the integrity of the courts, considered them "inadequate
to handle the trusts question. '247 Standing alone, these debates and
charges cannot establish any clear and unambiguous conclusion. But
reliance need not stop here. Reacting in a positive way to these chrages,
Congress passed the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
Congress included in the Clayton Act, the Section authorizing private
individuals to initiate action against economic combinations. Not unmindful that such a provision already existed in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, Congress passed a duplicate treble damage provision in Section 4 of the Clayton Act. This duplication was necessary, observed
Congressman Floyd, because Section 7 of the Sherman Act "has been
of little value and practically useless in the past, because the individual,
the small man, and the small concern, were utterly helpless in their efforts to confront in the courts these great and powerful corporations." 24 8
Perhaps the strongest evidence of Congressional displeasure with federal courts came with an amendment that would have given state courts
jurisdiction, concurrent with federal courts, to hear antitrust cases.249
The purpose of this amendment, as explained by its author, was to bring
convenience and justice to the people.2 50 Even more powerful was the
argument that jurisdiction in the state courts would insure a vigorous
244 Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15,
1914, Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731); Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 731).
(remarks of Congressman Buchanan).
245 51 CONG. REc. 9674 (1914)
240 Id. at 14,222 (remarks of Senator Thompson).
247

Id.

Id. at 9490 (remarks of Congressman Floyd). Reference was being made here
to the additional aid given to private parties, i.e., judgment in Government suits considered prima facie evidence.
249 Id. at 9663 (amendment offered by Congressman Cullop).
State court jurisdiction was also suggested when Congress was considering the Sherman Act. 21
CONG. REc. 3146 (1890) (remarks of Senator Reagan).
250 51 CONG. Rnc. 9663 (1914) (remarks of Congressman Cullop).
248
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enforcement of the "law in all its phases."2 il In the federal courts,
Congressman Cullop urged, it is the owners of the trusts and big corporations that receive protection. They have succeeded in forcing the

"poor man out of the benefits of such legislation as this" by seeking
and obtaining a federal forum for the adjudication of their cases.25 2
Congressman Reagan, supporting state jurisdiction when the Sherman
Act was being considered, said "[i]f we intend to give a civil remedy we
ought to give it in a jurisdiction within reach of the people of the United

States so as to make the remedy available to the people. If we do not
mean to give them a remedy we had better strike this section out, be-

cause this would be only a remedy for corporations or wealthy men,
and would not be a remedy for the great mass of the people.

25 8

Opposition to the amendment, which was finally defeated, was not

based on the purpose sought.25 4 Congressman Floyd, leading the op-

position, believed that this great dispersion of jurisdiction would weaken
-not strengthen-the enforcement of the newly affirmed Congressional
policy.2 55 Though racked with criticism, federal courts, in the end,
retained their status as the exclusive guardians of the national economic
system believed by Congress to be, under our political system, the most
desirable.
The United States Supreme Court, slow initially in assuming the full
responsibility charged to it by the Clayton Act has, since 1957, aligned

judicial policy with the vigorous enforcement sought by Congress. 25 0
The Court has repeatedly struck down corporate mergers and refused

to accept arguments and evidence based on value judgments.25 7 This
251
252

Id.
Id.

21 CONG. REc. 3146 (1890) (remarks of Senator Reagan).
Resolved into the Committee of the Whole House, the amendment was first
passed by a vote of 35 to 30. Upon a call for tellers on a second count, however, it
was defeated by a vote of 32 to 34. 51 CONG. REC. 9664 (1914).
255 Id. at 9663 (remarks of Congressman Floyd).
256 The first major turn in judicial construction of the original § 7 came in United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). After § 7 was
amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Act, the same hard stand was present in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The only problem with this
case was that the opinion could be read to support almost any position for or against
mergers. A greater manifestation of judicial change is seen in United States v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964), where the Court revived the early
railroad cases in which a hard stand had been taken against mergers that increased
private economic power.
257 Since the Celler-Kefauver Act, no corporate merger has, after full consideration,
received Supreme Court approval. The closest that any merger has come to being
approved was that between Pennsalt Chemicals and Olin Mathieson Chemical
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evolving judicial strictness, limited at the present time to the Supreme
Court, is not only present in merger cases but the Court has in recent

years been moving against all forms of economic power.268
Although in accord with congressional policy, the hard stand against
mergers and economic power has brought severe and undue criticism
upon the Court-and Justice Douglas in particular. 259 Unmoved by
this criticism, the Court continues undeterred, consistently demand-

ing divestiture as the only acceptable solution. 260 The official enforcement agencies have however, not responded to this hard judicial policy
and many large mergers have gone unchallenged, unquestioned, even

encouraged. Thus the concentration of economic power has become so
acute that the congressionally accepted concept of free competition is

facing extinction.
Perhaps as a result of this lax official enforcement policy, the United
2 61
States Supreme Court is manifesting a greater interest in private suits.

Challenge to corporate mergers will, following a more relaxed judicial
attitude, come from treble damage and divestiture suits filed by private
individuals injured in their business or property. Motivated solely by
their injury, free from the economists vision of a planned society, these

private parties will be seeking blind obedience to legislative standards.
When employees, suppliers, creditors and others forgotten or ignored

in the past, apply their full force against corporate mergers, further concentration of economic power should decrease. If stopped, the economy
of the nation will move toward decentralization-the goal sought by
(joint venture). This approval came in a per curiam opinion which affirmed a
lower court decision by an equally divided Court. Justice Marshall took no part in
the case. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 389 U.S. 308 (1967). See also
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). The latest and most severe rejection of value judgments came in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
258 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316
(1966); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13 (1964); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
269 Bork, The Supreme Court Versus Corporate Efficiency, FORTUNE, Aug., 1967,
at 93; Bork, Antitrust in Dubious Battle, FORTUNE, Sept., 1969, at 103.
260 Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969).
261 Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700
(1969); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969); Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969); Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.
392 U.S. 481 (1968); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134 (1968).
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Congress since 1890. As the injured parties recover treble damages
and obtain divestiture orders, perhaps a burden will be imposed on the
technological advancements sought by industry leaders and economists.
Should the burden outweigh the advantages of a decentralized economy, then it will be necessary for Congress to reconsider its earlier declared and codified economic policy. This, of course, would not mean
that corporate mergers would be freely permitted. As previously noted,
an alternative to a highly decentralized economy is government control. Merger engineers, who have formed massive empires in the form
of conglomerates, with their unrelenting acquisition pace, bring this alternative closer to reality. The issue will be determined by the success
or failure of the private suit.

